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Massachusetts, Myanmar, Market
Participation, and the Federal
Shutdown of Selective Purchasing
Laws: Is the Power to Purchase Really
the Power to Regulate?
Scott Sommers*
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 1999, the First Circuit Court of Appeals in NFTC v. Nat-
sios effectively forbade any state from enacting selective purchasing laws
that touch on foreign affairs. On June 19, 2000, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the decision. The Massachusetts "Burma Law," which limited state
*.D. Candidate, May 2001, Northwestern University School of Law.
'National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999). The First Cir-
cuit decided the case on June 22, 1999. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November
29, 1999 and heard oral argument on March 22, 2000. See Natsios v. National Foreign
Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999).
2 Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S.Ct. 2288 (2000).
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government purchases from companies doing business in Burma,3 was
struck down as unconstitutional.
Global corporations doing significant business with U.S. states and
their agencies may breathe a collective sigh of relief, knowing that they will
not face judgment or punishment for any of their activities outside the
United States. Citizens and taxpayers of states, however, may find the deci-
sion more problematic. Why does a state not have the right to choose its
suppliers based on the moral qualities of their involvements abroad? Indi-
vidual consumers routinely make purchasing choices based on more than
raw economic analysis. The citizen who chooses to buy an automobile
manufactured in her country, or the consumer who refuses to buy shoes
manufactured using slave labor exemplify these choices. It seems wrong
that states and their agencies should not have the same range of choices as
consumers in this regard because their choices, like the choices of individ-
ual consumers, apply economic rather than political leverage.
The state of Massachusetts, acting through its legislature, made a deci-
sion in June of 1996 to avoid buying any products from companies doing
business in Burma whenever reasonable economic alternatives existed. The
"Massachusetts Burma Law" was passed because of significant and ongo-
ing human rights abuses taking place in Burma due to the dictatorial gov-
ernment there in power. The justification behind the law is that companies
doing business in Burma are somehow complicit in the persistence of the
present regime and/or conditions in the country.
This article does not discuss whether intentionally giving companies an
incentive to withdraw from Burma is economically or politically desirable
for the people of Burma. The First Circuit did not concern itself with this
subject either in rejecting the Massachusetts Burma Law. The question of
interest to the court, and which should be of interest to any state citizen or
global corporation interested in doing business with state agencies, was
whether Massachusetts had the discretion to make a purchasing law directly
concerning the business involvement of suppliers in foreign countries.
While legitimate legal and practical arguments may be made that states
should not be allowed to take the foreign involvements of companies into
account when making purchasing decisions, 4 the First Circuit strains credi-
3 This article consistently refers to "Burma" because both district and appellate courts, as
well as the state of Massachusetts, refer to the country as such. In June 1989, the Burmese
government renamed the country the Union of Myanmar. Officials made the name change
in order to "better reflect ethnic diversity". The term Burma connotes Burman, the nation's
dominant ethnic group, to the exclusion of other ethnic minorities." Burma Decides It's the
"Union ofMyanmar," L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1989, at 11.
4 For an overview analysis of all the grounds on which the Massachusetts Burma law may
be found illegal or unconstitutional, see Lucien J. Dhooge, The Wrong Way to Mandalay:
The Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Act and the Constitution, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 387
(2000). Dhooge analyzes in full the foreign affairs power, foreign commerce clause, and
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bility by arguing that Massachusetts' action amounted to the "regulation" of
companies disfavored by the purchasing law.
This article considers just one of the aspects of the First Circuit's deci-
sion: the court's determination that the established "market participant" ex-
ception to the dormant Commerce Clause did not shield the Massachusetts
law from scrutiny. Under the exception, states may affect interstate, and
possibly international, flows of commerce so long as they confine their
conduct to participation in the market. The Supreme Court addresses the
market participation argument in a footnote, choosing to ground- its af-
firmation of the First Circuit's decision on federal preemption.5 It is not
surprising that the Supreme Court glosses over the market participant ex-
ception because the argument in favor of that exception is appealing in
cases of selective purchasing laws.
Part II of this article gives a brief factual overview of the present situa-
tion in Burma. Part I reviews the Massachusetts Burma Law. Part IV
gives an overview of the First Circuit and Supreme Court opinions. Part V
analyzes in detail the First Circuit's and Massachusetts' competing argu-
ments about the meaning of Supreme Court precedent on the Market Par-
ticipant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. Part VI concludes that
the First Circuit has misinterpreted the precedent in order to expediently
dismiss Massachusetts' market participant exception arguments, and the
Supreme Court has avoided the sticky issue by proceeding as though its
preemption/federalism analysis is valid regardless of the nature of the state
action.
I. THE SITUATION IN BURMA
The Massachusetts law was passed in response to the atrocious politi-
cal and social conditions persisting in Burma.6 Burma is ruled by a military
dictatorship and has been since 1962.7 In 1988, Aung San Suu Kyi's Na-
tional League for Democracy ("NLD") led nonviolent street protests against
the State Law and Order Restoration Council ("SLORC"), the euphemistic
moniker for the military junta.8 During the protest, government troops
preemption arguments, among others, that the First Circuit used in striking down the Massa-
chusetts Burma Law. This article addresses these arguments in passing only.
5 As such, this article gives only limited analysis of the Supreme Court decision, see pri-
marily infra section III.
6 This brief summary of the conditions in Burma represents an adapted and updated ver-
sion of that given by Lynn Loschin & Jennifer Anderson in Massachusetts Challenges the
Burmese Dictators: The Constitutionality of Selective Purchasing Laws, 39 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 373, 376-78 (1999).
7 See Burma Project Report 1994-1996, at http://www.burmaproject.org (last modified
Jan. 29, 2001). The Burma Project is a nonprofit foundation founded by the financier
George Soros to promote democracy in Burma.
8 See Brad Miller, Burma in Chains: U.S. Companies Profit from Slavery, THE
PRoGaasSiv, Oct. 1995, at 32.
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killed as many as 10,000 people in the streets, but, in contrast to the Tian-
anmen Square uprising in China, shocking television images never reached
the outside world due to the regime's heavy-handed control of the media.9
When the NLD won national elections in 1989, the military government re-
fused to honor the election results, arrested 3,000 NLD workers, and put the
elected members of parliament into prison.10 Ms. Suu Kyi, who is 55 and a
1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner, was recently detained and placed under
house arrest by SLORC because, according to an "investigation" by the
military, she is "a traitor collaborating with Western nations to destabilize
Myanmar."'
'
Unsurprisingly, given its political situation, Burma has an extremely
poor record on human rights. The United Nations Commission on Human
Rights, Amnesty International, and other groups have continued to con-
demn SLORC for the use of torture, disappearances, and forced labor.
12
SLORC has, however, continuously sought foreign investment to
strengthen Burma's economy. Between 1990 and 1996, SLORC received
65% of its finances from foreign oil companies. 13 One of the most signifi-
cant foreign investments is a natural gas pipeline funded by Unocal and
Total.14 Eyewitness accounts suggest that slave labor is being used to build
the pipeline and many other tourism and infrastructure projects in the coun-
try. 5
In 1995, Berkeley, California became the first city to pass a selective
purchasing ordinance concerning Burma, and several other municipalities
adopted similar laws.' 6 Selective purchasing laws represent acts of self-
restraint by which sub-national governments internally regulate their own
purchases. Several large companies, including Levi-Strauss, Amoco,
Carlsberg, Columbia, Liz Claiborne, Philips Electronics, and Eddie Bauer
halted operations in Burma after the enactment of the Berkeley law.17 After
Massachusetts adopted its similar selective purchasing law in 1996, Mo-
torola, Hewlett Packard, and Apple Computer pulled out citing the Massa-
9 See John Pilger, In a Land ofFear, THE GuARDIAN (U.K.), May 4, 1996, at 12.
'0 See id. at 14.
1 Burmese Freed By the Junta Plan to Test Its Limits, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 2000, at 3.
12 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996
598 (1997).
13 See Pilger, supra note 9, at 16.
14 See As Administration Weighs Burma Sanctions, Unocal Inks New Gas Deal,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 31, 1997.
15 See Pilger, supra note 9, at 16.
16 See David Schmahmann & James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and Local
Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 182, n.22 (1997).
17 See Rights Group Says Total Backs Burma Junta, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Oct. 23,
1996.
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chusetts law as one reason.18 Apple, for example, stated that it was pulling
out of Burma so as to continue supplying Massachusetts' lucrative market
for computers in schools.' 9 Other firms, including Pepsico and J. Crew, may
have been responding to consumer boycotts and did not specifically attrib-
ute their exit from Burma to the Massachusetts law.
20
A Burmese general, Khin Nyunt, testified to the efficacy of the stance
taken by Massachusetts and other sub-national governments by admitting
that they were creating a crisis. 2' Early in 1998, the Burmese generals hired
two firms of management consultants, Bain and Jefferson Waterman, to
lobby governments. During the makeover, the junta changed its name
from the State Law and Order Restoration Council to the less ominous State
Peace and Development Council. 
2
Many foreign companies continue to do business with the military
junta. Total foreign investment in Burma at the end of 1998 exceeded nine
billion dollars, with the United States as the fifth largest foreign investor,
after the United Kingdom, France, Singapore, and Thailand.2 4 Massachu-
setts' restricted purchase list includes such well-known names as Mitsubishi
and Sony, both of which continue operations in Burma.2 5 The selective
purchasing laws, as well as the limited sanctions that both the United States
and European Union have imposed, have not yet had a palpable effect in
softening the Burmese regime.
III. THE MASSACHUSETrS BURMA LAW, ITS ATTACKERS, AND ITS
DEFENDERS
On its face, the law at issue in NFTC v. Natsios concerns only the pur-
chasing decisions of Massachusetts and its state governmental agencies.
The First Circuit noted that the law "does not impose any explicit limits on
the ability of private parties to engage in business in Burma, or on the abil-
ity of private parties or local governments to purchase products from firms
engaged in business in Burma. 2 6 Nor does the law completely forbid com-
panies doing business in Burma from selling goods and services to the state
of Massachusetts; rather, bids from such companies are increased by 10%
18 See Michael Grunwald, Trade Tiff Widens Over State 'Burma Law,' BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 1, 1997, atB1.
19 Ted Bardacke, American Burma Boycotts Start to Bite, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 6,
1997, at 6.
2 See Grunwald, supra note 18
21 See Nick Cohen, Hold on a Minute...; Why the FO is Run by Village Idiots, THE
OBSERVER, Sept. 20, 1998, at 32.
22 See id.
21 See id.
24 See Dhooge, supra note 4, at 395-96.
21 See Loschin & Anderson, supra note 6, at 378.26National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,46 (1st Cir. 1999).
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when compared to competing bids.27 Companies that provide goods or
services to Massachusetts unavailable from other suppliers, and companies
that produce certain medical devices or provide news and telecommunica-
tions services in Burma, are excepted from the law.28
Before a company can bid on a Massachusetts contract, the law re-
quires it to provide a sworn declaration disclosing any business it does in
Burma. The law defines "doing business in Burma" broadly to include:
(a) Having a principal place of business, place of incorporation or...
corporate headquarters in Burma (Myanmar) or having any operations, leases,
franchises, majority-owned subsidiaries, distribution agreements, or any other
similar agreements in Burma (Myanmar), or being the majority-owned sub-
sidiary, licensee or franchise of such a person;
(b) Providing financial services to the government of Burma (Myanmar),
including providing direct loans, underwriting government securities, provid-
ing any consulting advice or assistance, providing brokerage services, acting as
a trustee or escrow agent, or otherwise acting as an agent pursuant to a con-
tractual agreement;
(c) Promoting the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil, gas or other
related products, commerce in which is largely controlled by the government
of Burma (Myanmar), from Burma (Myanmar);
ad) Providing any goods or services to the government of Burma (Myan-
mar). 9
The law requires the Secretary of Administration and Finance for the
state of Massachusetts to maintain a "restricted purchase list" of all firms
engaged in business with Burma.30 At the time the National Foreign Trade
Council ('NFTC") filed its complaint, 346 companies were on the restricted
purchase list.31 Forty-four of these companies were U.S. companies.32 Sev-
eral companies have withdrawn from Burma, citing the Massachusetts law
as one of the reasons.33
The law did not include an express statement of purpose.3 4 However,
the First Circuit puts special emphasis on some of the statements made by
proponents of the law. State Representative Byron Rushing, for example,
stated that the "identifiable goal" of the law was "free democratic elections
in Burma."35 Significantly, Massachusetts argued before the district court
that the law reflects "the historic concerns of the citizens of Massachusetts"
27 See id.
21 See id.
29 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.7, § 22G (West 1996).
30 See Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 45.
31 See id. at 47.
32 see id.
33 See id.; see also supra notes 18-20.
34 See Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 46.
35 id.
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with supporting the rights "of people around the world. 36 Massachusetts
did not at any point contend that the law would provide any economic bene-
fit to Massachusetts.37
Though the law clearly applies on its face only to internal state pur-
chasing decisions, opponents of the Massachusetts Burma Law, including
foreign governments, consistently portray the law as a regulation of multi-
national corporations. On September 22, 1998, both Japan and the Euro-
pean Union opened legal proceedings in the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), in the words of a sympathetic commentator, "to force the U.S.
state of Massachusetts to do business with firms that trade with Burma. 38
Initial European Union and Japanese protests were prompted in part by
fears that the state might extend the provisions to companies doing business
in Indonesia to protest human rights violations in East Timor.39 More gen-
erally, however, foreign governments wished to halt the proliferation of
sanctions in the United States being brought below the federal level.40 In
1994, the European Union published a report identifying more than 2,700
sub-national laws and municipal ordinances that potentially violate
GATT.41 As of 1997, ninety laws in California alone could be challenged
under the WTO.42 As of November 1999, more than two dozen state and
local governments, including New York City, barred their departments and
agencies from buying from companies doing business in Burma, Cuba, and
other countries with authoritarian governments.4 3 The European commis-
sion rested its legal case in the WTO on the claim that Massachusetts was
imposing "political" rather than economic conditions when it awards public
contracts.44 The British Foreign Office stated, in a typical comment, "We
want to stop U.S. states imposing their law on European companies, 4 5 im-
plying that conditional refusal to award a contract amounted to positive
regulation. Interestingly, the European Union had already withdrawn its
36 Id. at 47.
37 see id.38 Katherine Butler, EU tries to Scrap Burma Sanctions, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
Sept. 22, 1998, at 15.
39 See Ted Bardacke, American Burma Boycotts Start to Bite, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
6,1997, at 6.
40 See Butler, supra note 38.
41 See Brian Owens, The World Trade Organization and States' Rights: Will Foreign
Threats over Massachusetts' Burma Law Lead to a Domestic Backlash Against International
Trade Agreements?, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 957, 977 (1998).
42 see id.
43 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Decide Foreign Policy Question in Massachusetts
Boycott ofMyanmar, N. Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1999, at A20.
44 See Butler, supra note 38.
45 Cohen, supra note 21.
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own trading preferences with Burma when it attacked the Massachusetts
law.
46
Foreign protest must also be seen in the context of the strenuous oppo-
sition to the Helms-Burton sanctions against foreigners doing business in
Cuba and the attendant impatience with perceived American unilateral trade
action.47 However, the Helms-Burton law does not parallel the Massachu-
setts Burma Law. As an editorialist in The Observer stated:
European firms [that] deal with Castro face the seizure of their U.S. assets and
the arrest of their executives. Companies that trade with Burma just lose or-
ders from Americans who are choosing how to spend their own money. The
[European Union] is not defending Europe against American arrogance, as its
alliance with U.S. corporations shows.
48
Massachusetts and its defenders consistently portray the law as a dis-
cretionary purchasing decision. One commentator, at the extreme, summa-
rized that "[t]he [European Union] and the free-market companies who are
pulling its strings say the public can have no freedom of choice in the mar-
ket.' 49 Additionally, the state has received support from labor unions, who
are concerned about competition from slave labor in underdeveloped coun-
tries. In January 1997, the International Confederation of Free Trade Un-
ions alleged that 800,000 Burmese had been made to work against their
will.50 The leaders of eleven domestic trade unions called on President
Clinton to defend the Massachusetts law.51 The State of Massachusetts, in
its brief to the appeals court, noting that 23 states and 80 cities had once had
"selective purchasing" laws toward South Africa, more modestly contended
that "[n]othing in our federal constitution denies to the states the right to
apply a moral standard to their spending decisions.' 52 The Supreme Court
contends in its Crosby decision that it never ruled on the legitimacy of such
sanctions. 3
Ironically, the National Foreign Trade Council, which brought the ac-
tion against the state and represents over 550 major U.S. corporations, re-
fused to identify its members because the members feared consumer
boycotts.54 Since the law at issue is effectively a boycott by the state of
46 See Marc Selinger, State Law Punishing Burma Probed, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998,
atB8.
47 See Butler, supra note 38.4
9 Cohen, supra note 21.49 Id. (quoting Simon Billenness of Boston's Franklin Research Development Legal
Center).
50 See Burma's Children Suffer from Forced Labor, REUTERS NEWS RELEASE, Jan. 15,
1997.
51 See Owens, supra note 41, at 970.
52 Justices to Decide Foreign Policy Question in Massachusetts Boycott of Myanmar, N.
Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 1999, at A20.
53 See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 2302 (2000)..
5 See generally Sanctions on Burma: Who has the right?, NATION, Sept. 27, 1998.
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Massachusetts, the question presented by challenges to the law is whether
Massachusetts has the same rights as the consumers that the NFTC member
companies fear.
IV. THE FIRST CIRCUIT AND SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
The First Circuit rejects the Massachusetts Burma Law using the fol-
lowing legal arguments:
A. Massachusetts has violated the foreign affairs power of the federal
government. It has done so because its Burma Law "affects significant is-
sues of foreign policy."'s5
B. Massachusetts cannot avoid scrutiny under the foreign affairs
power merely because the law at issue concerns purchasing decisions by
Massachusetts state agencies. No "market participant" exception to the for-
eign affairs power of the federal government exists.56
C. Even if such an exception existed, Massachusetts is not acting as a
market participant. Massachusetts is regulating a market by refusing to buy
from companies that do business in Burma. 7
D. Massachusetts has violated the foreign commerce clause because it
is regulating commerce beyond its borders.58
E. Federal law on Burma preempts the Massachusetts law. 9
Though the First Circuit thus presents its decision in five parts, the
opinion actually offers only three independent legal arguments because the
conclusions of certain legal arguments affect the premises of others.60 The
three legal arguments are: (1) that Massachusetts is engaging in foreign af-
fairs, impermissible under the foreign affairs power given to the federal
government in the Constitution, (2) that the Massachusetts Burma Law is
not about "purchasing" but is in fact an attempt to "regulate" a market, and
(3) that federal law on Burma preempts the Massachusetts law. This article
5s National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 49-61 (1st Cir. 1999).
"6 See id. at 59-61.
17 See id. at 62-65.
58 See id. at 61-71.
59 See id. at 71-77.
60 Three independent legal arguments fall out of the five because argument B amounts to
little more than an assertion by the First Circuit, and argument D above depends crucially on
the truth of argument C. There is no caselaw conclusively demonstrating that state conduct
protected by the market participant exception to the domestic commerce clause is not also
shielded from the foreign affairs power. The First Circuit admits argument B is "novel," and
merely asserts that "this view directly contradicts the Supreme Court's repeated statements
that the federal government's foreign affairs power is not limited." Id. at 51, 53. As for ar-
gument D, if a state is not "regulating" under the market participant exception, it cannot
logically be "regulating" conduct beyond its borders. Or, to put it another way, behavior
shielded by the market participant exception should be immune from foreign just as it is
from domestic commerce clause scrutiny.
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addresses only the validity of and issues raised by the second legal argu-
ment that the First Circuit makes against the Massachusetts Burma Law be-
cause that argument is both the most appealing one in Massachusetts' favor,
and its resolution affects the equities of the first and third arguments.
The Supreme Court Opinion rests its affirmation entirely upon federal
preemption in general, and conflict preemption analysis in particular.61 Ac-
cording to the Court, the congressional Burma statute,62 passed three
months after the Massachusetts Burma Law took effect, preempted the
Massachusetts law because:
[The Massachusetts law] undermines the intended purpose and 'natural
effect' of at least three provisions of the federal Act[;] that is, its dele-
gation of effective discretion to the President to control economic sanc-
tions against Burma, its limitation of sanctions solely to United States
persons and new investment, and its directive to the President to pro-
ceed diplomatically in developing a comprehensive multilateral strategy
towards Burma.63
These preemption arguments fail to take into account the entirely dif-
ferent natures of the Massachusetts and Federal laws. The federal law per-
mits "economic sanctions" because it allows the President to ban new
investment by "United States persons" in Burma. In contrast, the Massa-
chusetts law fits the description of an economic boycott because the Massa-
chusetts law governs not the behavior of companies or individuals but the
purchasing behavior of the state. This distinction is crucial because the Su-
preme Court argues conflict preemption grounded on the idea that "the state
statute penalizes some private action that the federal Act (as administered
by the President) may' allow, and pulls levers of influence that the federal
Act does not reach." In fact, the Massachusetts Burma Act "penalizes" no
one: the state does not apply its coercive legal power against companies
trading with Burma, as would the federal government against violators of a
sanctions regime imposed by the President. It is the state's spending power5
that is at issue. The Supreme Court argues, in a footnote,6 that it has re-
jected the argument that a State's "statutory scheme . . . escapes pre-
emption because it is an exercise of the State's spending power rather than
its regulatory power."'66 The case on which the Supreme Court relies for
this precedent, however, concerned a state law that applied a state boycott
to past violators of federal labor laws, and thus had no functional purpose
61 See Crosby, 120 S.Ct., at 2294, n8.
62 See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act,
1997, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to 3009-167 (enacted by the Omnibus Consulidated Appro-
priations Act, 1997, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 3009-121 to 3009-172).
63 Crosby, 120 S.Ct., at 2294.
6Id. at 2296.
65 Id. at 2294, n.7.
6Id., citing Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S.
282, 287 (1986).
Massachusetts, Myanmar, and Market Participation
21:317 (2000)
except to modify the penalty for the violation of a federal law, and bore no
relationship to state procurement. 7 The Massachusetts Burma Law, in
contrast, makes no reference to federal laws, and does not use spending
power to frustrate the intent of federal laws. In addition, the law bears a ra-
tional relationship to the desires of the people of the state of Massachusetts
for their state's purchasing. For precisely this reason, to allow state inter-
ests to influence state purchasing, the market participant exception to the
dormant commerce clause was created.
V. THE "MARKET PARTICIPANT" EXCEPTION
The most intuitive argument in Massachusetts' favor is that the federal
government has no business telling a state from whom it must buy. This bit
of common sense is established in the "market participant" exception to the
dormant commerce clause: "[I]f a state is acting as a market participant,
rather than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no
limitation on its activities. 68 The basic rationale behind the market partici-
pant exception affords states the freedom of consumers when they act as
consumers-as entities with interests and desires that have an influence on
their own behavior in the market-but not when they act in their official
capacity as lawgivers. 69 Though the market participant exception has been
recognized at least since the 1940' S, 70 it received its fullest expression in
1980 in the case of Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, in which the Supreme Court held
that the role of each state to act as "guardian and trustee for its peoples"
mandated federal restraint in the area of state procurement.7' Thus, "states
may fairly claim some measure of sovereign interest in retaining freedom to
decide how, with whom, and for whose benefit to deal. 72
The First Circuit's opinion, from the standpoint of one who disagrees
with the ultimate holding in the case, presents one central problem: having
concluded that Massachusetts' action is impermissible because it affects
foreign affairs and foreign commerce, the court simply refuses to accept
that the law is what it appears to be on its face, a proprietary selective pur-
chasing law. The law clearly does not regulate the conduct of anyone other
than the state itself, and it merely "governs" the state's participation in the
67 See infra Part IVE.
68 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984) (White, J., plu-
rality) (cited in Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 62 (lst Cir. 1999)).69 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287,293 (D. Mass 1998).
70 See Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940) ("[t]he Government enjoys
the unrestricted power ... to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms
and conditions upon which it will make needed purchases.").
71 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980); see also infra discussion of
Reeves in Part D.
72 1d. at 438 n.10. This discussion of the origins of the market participant has been
adapted from Dhooge. See Dhooge, supra note 4, at 466-67.
327
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markets for goods that it buys. The First Circuit advances four reasons why
the law does not represent market participation: the law (1) affects activity
unrelated to the transactions that it governs, (2) governs too wide a range of
transactions, (3) does not have an economic purpose, and (4) is not moti-
vated by sufficiently "ordinary" market concerns. While one can debate the
merit of these objections, none of them go to the heart of the matter. The
heart of the matter is whether the Massachusetts Burma Law, regardless of
its consequences or intentions, represents nothing more than participation in
the market.
Because at the most basic level, Massachusetts is indeed merely par-
ticipating in the market, the First Circuit must devise strained arguments for
why the state is "really" regulating. The sections that follow analyze the
First Circuit's interpretation of the meaning, scope, and nature of state
regulation as compared with market participation. An evaluation of the
cases on which the court relies for precedent challenges the court's logic.
A. White and the Coercion Problem
In theory, the First Circuit's strongest argument is that the Burma Law
coerces private parties, and therefore regulates them indirectly. In response
to Massachusetts' argument that its law does not coerce, the court first ad-
dresses White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employees, Inc.
73
In White, the city of Boston passed a law requiring that all contractors
working for the city of Boston employ at least 50% Boston residents.74 The
Supreme Court concluded that Boston was acting as a market participant in
the market for contractors and was free to buy from whom it chose.75 In
confronting this case, the First Circuit comments that the Supreme Court
found "no evidence that the executive order in question was an attempt to
force virtually all businesses that benefit in some way from the economic
ripple effect" 76 of the city's construction contracts "to bias their employ-
ment practices in favor of the [city's] residents. 77 The First Circuit quotes
this language as if it has significance, but the opinion does not explain why
the Massachusetts Burma Law differs in nature from the Boston law. It is
difficult to find a difference.
Surely, just as firms that hope to engage in business with Massachu-
setts have an incentive to end their involvement in Burma, so were firms
that hoped to perform contracting work for Boston given an incentive to
hire more Boston residents. Rarely would offering an incentive for busi-
73 White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employees, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
74 See id. at 205 n.1 (describing the statute at issue).
75 See id. at 205.76 Id. at 211, cited in Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 62-63 (1 st Cir.
1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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nesses to act a certain way in order to win government contracts qualify as
an attempt to "force virtually all businesses that benefit in some way''78
from state purchasing to change their behavior. Here, as in White, there is
no question of Massachusetts attempting to control the behavior of compa-
nies that enjoy a "ripple effect" from state purchasing decisions. The Mas-
sachusetts Burma Law places no restrictions on companies that do business
with companies that in turn do business with the state-this pattern would
represent the kind of forbidden "ripple effect" noted in White.
Companies may always choose not to sell to the governmental body in
question. This fact makes the White decision even more amenable to an
interpretation favorable to Massachusetts. Construction contracting is, by
hypothesis, a relatively local business, and conditions that Boston imposed
would have loomed large for local contractors, because the city would
likely purchase a significant amount of construction services in the Boston
market. In contrast, the Massachusetts Burma Law only would set terms
for companies that, by definition, are global corporations with contracts all
over the world. Most, if not all, companies large enough to be doing busi-
ness in Burma do not absolutely need to have Massachusetts as a customer.
Relatively few corporations have pulled out of Burma despite the Massa-
chusetts law; this fact proves that the law does not coerce.79
In response to Massachusetts' argument that its law parallels the order
upheld in White, the court responds:
But White involved an attempt to dictate the employment of Boston residents
in projects funded by the city; it did not involve an attempt by Boston to re-
quire all contractors with the city to employ Boston residents in all of their
other projects, a situation more akin to this case.80
The court's analogy overstates the breadth of the conditions that the
Burma Law imposes. The Burma Law merely placed conditions on the
suppliers' specific contacts with Burma, not "all of their other projects."
Nevertheless, the court complains that the conditions that Massachusetts
attempts to impose "are not even remotely connected to such companies'
interactions with Massachusetts." 81 The court fails, however, to adequately
explain why.
The court's complaint displays the following view: the conditions that
a state imposes on its trading partners must directly concern the transaction
at issue between the state and the company, otherwise the condition is
regulatory in nature. This conclusion is not logical. When a consumer de-
cides whether to buy a pair of shoes from a company known to employ
slave labor, she considers not just how the company made the actual prod-
uct she contemplates purchasing, but all of the other things the company
7
1 See White, 460 U.S., at 211 (emphasis added).
79 See Grunwald, supra note 18; see also Bardacke, supra note 19.
go National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 63 (1st Cir. 1999).
81Id.
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does as well. Indeed, companies expend great resources to make consumers
feel goodwill towards their brands generally, not only towards their specific
products, knowing that goodwill strongly influences purchasing behavior.
Companies and consumers alike realize that purchasing decisions turn on
more than the explicit terms of the transaction. For this reason, the partici-
pation/regulation distinction should not turn on whether the governmental
consumer narrowly considers just the good or service underlying the trans-
action or whether it considers larger issues. White itself proves this: Boston
did not require 50% employment of Boston residents because it believed
Boston residents would do a better or cheaper construction job, but because
the city wanted to benefit its residents. In other words, although the em-
ployment condition related to the transaction, the condition did not relate in
any economically rational way. The relation between the conditions of the
Massachusetts Burma Law and the transactions at issue is no more distant
than the relation between the conditions and the transactions in White.
The court's assertion that the conditions that Massachusetts imposes on
potential suppliers "are not even remotely connected" to Massachusetts'
"interactions"82 with those suppliers misinterprets Massachusetts' motiva-
tions. The Massachusetts Burma Law has moral foundations. The law re-
lies on the premise that it is immoral for Massachusetts to "interact,"
commercially, with companies doing business in Burma. Just as the law in
White was not really about construction, the Burma Law is not really about
the products available for purchase. Rather, the law focuses on the state's
"interaction" with suppliers that it deems morally tainted. Thus, the condi-
tions of moral corporate behavior imposed by the law are intimately con-
nected to Massachusetts "interactions" with those suppliers. The fact that
the conduct at issue takes place "far away" does not have any bearing on the
participation/regulation issue because ordinary market participants routinely
base their individual purchasing decisions, and especially decisions that
touch on morality, on conduct happening "far away." The court's view of
the matter is tantamount to asserting that ordinary market participants never
take moral issues into account, which is absurd.
B. South-Central Timber and the "External Market" Problem.
The First Circuit next suggests that Massachusetts attempts to control
not its own purchasing but an external market. The court suggests that
NFTC presents a factual situation similar to South-Central Timber Dev., v.
Wunnicke.83 In South-Central Timber, the state of Alaska chose to sell
state-owned timber. However, the state required that the timber only be
sold to companies that agreed to process the timber in state. The Supreme
8
2 id.
83 See generally South-Central Timber Dev., v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
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Court concluded that Alaska was attempting impermissibly to regulate a
market
8 4
The First Circuit concludes that South-Central Timber teaches that the
market participant exception does not "sanction the imposition of any terms
that the State might desire,"' 5 and "the doctrine is not carte blanche to im-
pose any conditions that the state has the economic power to dictate."8 6 The
market participant doctrine cannot "immunize [a state's] downstream regu-
lation of a market in which it is not a participant."8"
What the First Circuit misses in its analysis of South-Central Timber is
that the relationship between the transactions at issue and the law at issue is
quite different for the Massachusetts Burma Law. Whereas the law at issue
in South-Central Timber applied to a single type of good over whose supply
the state exercised substantial control, the law in NFTC v. Natsios applies to
thousands of goods (everything the state buys), for none of which is Massa-
chusetts a sole purchaser. In South-Central Timber, the state of Alaska had
truly "created a market," namely the market for state-owned timber.
Whether or not one considers the market for state-owned timber conceptu-
ally distinct from the market for Alaskan timber generally, the state un-
questionably owns enough timber for it to play the part of an economic
oligarch in this market. Because it is in the position of a near or total
monopsonist, Alaska truly had the "economic power" to "dictate" virtually
any "terms" at all regarding what was done with its timber.8 If Alaska had
said that any company hoping to purchase state-owned timber had to cut up
the trees and turn them into matchsticks, any logging company interested in
the tremendous market for state-owned timber would have had to sell the
trees they felled to match companies. Because Alaska imposed conditions
on what could be done with the timber after its sale, its law amounted to a
regulation of a market that did not relate to the transaction at issue. The
transaction at issue was the sale of state-owned timber, but the market
regulated was that for timber processing. Logically, some sort of economic
power is required to turn a purchasing condition into a regulation. Other-
wise, any consumer would "regulate" a market whenever she chose be-
tween competing goods.
Massachusetts simply does not have the economic power, in the spe-
cific context of its Burma Law, to turn its purchasing conditions into regu-
lations. Massachusetts buys thousands of different goods and services from
thousands of suppliers. The Massachusetts Burma Law covers everthing
the state and its agencies buy, from soft-drinks to heavy equipment. Vir-
' See id. at 84.
"' Id. at 95-96, cited in Natsios, 181 F.3d at 63.
86 South-Central Timber, 467 U.S., at 97, cited in Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 63.
87 Id. at 99, cited in Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 63.
" See id. at 95-97, cited in Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 63.
89 See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 22G (1996).
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tually every one of these goods and services already is traded in a huge
market, and Massachusetts is one customer among many. More impor-
tantly, wherever the law would have any effect, the supplier already must be
involved in a global market since it is also doing business on the other side
of the world in Burma, an economic backwater. Massachusetts did not
"create" the huge markets for these goods, any more than an individual con-
sumer "creates" a shoe market when she shops for shoes. Granted, Massa-
chusetts is a large purchaser-the court notes that the state buys over $2
billion in goods and services a yearg--but the relevant criterion is Massa-
chusetts' power with respect to individual suppliers in individual markets.
Whereas in South-Central Timber, Alaska compelled a logging company to
do whatever Alaska wanted if the company was to participate in the market
for state-owned timber, here, firms remain free to simply choose not to sell
to the state of Massachusetts and to continue to do business in Burma.
Firms still can participate in whatever market they sell their goods in, be-
cause Massachusetts is but one participant in that market. The market for
Alaskan state-owned timber was a unique market, most significantly in
space. In contrast, the market represented by Massachusetts's purchasing
needs is not unique, either in space or in type. Any company doing busi-
ness in Burma can sell goods in Massachusetts; it merely cannot sell to the
state. Influence over a market, which Massachusetts may have to a limited
extent, should not be confused with economic power of the type that Alaska
could wield.9 '
In sum, the First Circuit fails to apprehend that the reason that Alaska
was a market regulator, rather than a market participant, is that it had con-
trolling economic power. Therefore, it was in a position to regulate a mar-
ket different from the one in which the transaction took place through what
appeared to be mere conditions placed on its trading partners.
The court next addresses Massachusetts' contention that Alaska's law
in South-Central Timber differs significantly from the Massachusetts
Burma Law because the Alaska law restricted private economic activity af-
ter the transaction with the state was completed. Massachusetts argued that
its Burma Law does not restrict private economic activity after the comple-
tion of the state contract, whereas the Alaska law applied specifically to
what would be done with the product in question after the transaction was
completed.92
90 See Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 46.
91 It is difficult to determine whether some of the companies cited by Grunwald actually
withdrew because of the Massachusetts Burma law or not. See Grunwald, supra note 18.
They may, for example, have been intending to withdraw consistent with internal policies
but were happy to give their shareholders a business reason for doing so as well.
92 See Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 64.
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The court concedes that Massachusetts is "technically correct 93 in that
companies can do whatever they choose once they complete their contracts
with Massachusetts, but the court responds that the monitoring of compa-
nies' activities in Burma is "ongoing" and not limited to individual pur-
chasing decisions.94 For example, "Massachusetts is attempting to regulate
unrelated activities of its contractors once a contract is signed but before its
performance is completed. ' 95 This statement is true, but it does not respond
to Massachusetts' argument. One of the reasons why South-Central Timber
exemplified regulation was that the conditions that Alaska imposed took ef-
fect after the actual transaction was entirely completed: Alaska would only
sell a buyer timber if, after the timber was paid for and delivered, the buyer
processed it in-state.96 I contrast, the Massachusetts law imposes no con-
ditions whatever on vendor behavior after the Massachusetts contract is
completed.97
Presenting no cogent rebuttal to Massachusetts' "timeline" argument,
the court tries to shift the debate about South-Central Timber to the issue of
the substance of the conduct on which the state conditions its purchasing.
"Importantly," the court says, "the Massachusetts Burma Law applies to
conduct not even remotely linked to Massachusetts . ..Under South-
Central Timber, states may not use the market participant exception to
shield otherwise impermissible regulatory behavior that goes beyond ordi-
nary private market conduct."98 Here, we see the recurring theme that be-
cause the conduct on which the state conditions its purchases remains
remote and "unrelated," the state is "regulating." Once again, the court im-
plies that it cannot be "ordinary private market conduct" to consider any-
thing but price when making purchasing decisions. However, it is precisely
so the state can take other issues into account that the market participant ex-
ception exists at all! Market participation is an exception to the commerce
clause, which normally forbids states from interfering with interstate com-
merce. South-Central Timber certainly cannot show that Massachusetts'
conditions amount to "impermissible regulatory behavior" merely because
they concern activities remote to the transaction. Alaska's impermissible
conditions were proximate to the transaction: they concerned what would
happen to the products as soon as the transaction was complete. Yet,
Alaska still was guilty of regulation.
The First Circuit has no convincing response to the most powerful of
Massachusetts' arguments: that the effects of its law are not relevant to the
inquiry into whether it is acting as a regulator. Once again, the First Circuit
93 Id. at 64.
94 id.
95 id.
'6 See generally South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 83-85 (1984).97 The court admits this fact. See Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 64.
98 See id.
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simply asserts that Massachusetts cannot use the market participant excep-
tion to pursue the goals that it is pursuing and does not explain how the
goals of a state law are relevant to the crucial participant/regulator distinc-
tion. In fact, they are not. The First Circuit uses this argument to attempt to
disable the market participant exception because the court wishes to shift
the focus to the Foreign Affairs power, where it has a more tenable argu-
ment: that Massachusetts' action impermissibly interferes with the Federal
government's control over foreign policy.99
C. Camps Newfound and the Problem of Scope
Third, the First Circuit attempts to show that the Massachusetts law af-
fects too broad a range of transactions to be shielded by the market partici-
pant exception. In support of its position, it points to Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison.1 ° In Camps Newfound, the
Supreme Court struck down a Maine statute that limited tax benefits to non-
profit organizations serving out-of-state residents versus organizations
serving Maine residents.101 The First Circuit takes this case as an admoni-
tion against an "expansion of the market participant exception ' 'I 2 because
the Supreme Court said that Maine's tax exemption "must be viewed as ac-
tion taken in the State's sovereign capacity rather than a proprietary deci-
sion to make an entry into all of the markets in which the exempted
charities function." 10 3
Camps Newfound concerned tax law, not state purchasing decisions. It
seems obvious that Maine should not avail itself of the market participant
exception simply because its tax law involves the state obliquely in the
"markets" in which non-profit organizations function.1 4 Tax law repre-
sents a form of state regulation: it governs not the state government's own
behavior but the actions of private individuals and organizations. The only
relevant question for the dormant commerce clause is whether it discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce.
99 See id. at 49-61.
See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
101 See id. at 567.
1
0 2 See Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 63.
103 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 594, cited in Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 63.
104 Indeed, this was the Supreme Court's central problem with the Maine statute.
mhe notion that whenever a State provides a discriminatory tax abatement it is "purchasing" some
service in its proprietary capacity is not readily confined to the charitable context. A special tax
concession for liquors indigenous to Hawaii, for example, might be conceived as a "purchase" of the
jobs produced by local industry... Discriminatory schemes favoring local farmers might be seen as
the "purchase" of agricultural services in order to ensure that the State's citizens will have a steady
local supply of the product... Our cases provide no support for the Town's radical effort to expand
the market-participant doctrine.
Id.
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Here, in contrast, the issue is whether Massachusetts is regulating in
the first place: if it is not doing so, then interstate, and by extension foreign
commerce effects should be disregarded. Camps Newfound does not help
the court prove that the market participant exception must involve "a dis-
crete activity focused on a single industry," 10 5 as it claims. Indeed, Massa-
chusetts argued to the First Circuit that Camps Newfound actually supports
Massachusetts' position and pointed out that the court in Camps Newfound
distinguished the Maine tax law at issue from laws that involve state pur-
chases of goods and services. 106 This distinction fatally flaws the First Cir-
cuit's use of the case as precedent. Nonetheless, the First Circuit responds
in a footnote that the distinction "does not support the contention that all
state purchasing decisions are protected by the market participant excep-
tion,"' 07 (emphasis added), which is true enough, but the court does not ac-
knowledge that the distinction makes the First Circuit's argument about the
precedent set by Camps Newfound very weak indeed.
D. Alexandria Scrap, Reeves and the Problem of Goals
Massachusetts points out that in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,'05
the Supreme Court allowed the state of Maryland to act as a market partici-
pant to pursue environmental concems-a goal beyond local and economic
well-being. Maryland imposed extra documentation requirements on out-
of-state scrap metal processors who sought to receive bounties from the
state for converting junk cars into scrap. As in Newfound Camps, Alexan-
dria Scrap did not involve the state actually purchasing goods or services,
yet the Court still found a valid market participant exception. 10 9 Some
commentators have concluded from Alexandria Scrap and Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake"0 that the market participant doctrine has been upheld when states
"intended their entrances [into the market] to affect the flow of commerce
so as to enhance public values.""' In Reeves, the state of South Dakota,
which owned cement factories, passed a law limiting its sale of cement to
South Dakota residents during a cement shortage, and the Supreme Court
upheld the law.
's See id., cited in Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 63.
'06 See id.
107 Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 64 n.19.
108 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
'09 See id. at 809-810 ("Maryland entered the market for the purpose, agreed by all to be
commendable as well as legitimate, of protecting the state's environment... Nothing in the
purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over
others.").
110 See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
111 LAWRENCEH. TRIBE, CONSTTUTIONAL CHoIcEs 144 (1985) (emphasis added).
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The First Circuit counters that Alexandria Scrap, Reeves, and White
indicate that a state may "favor its own citizens over others" using the mar-
ket participant exception, but "this doctrine does not permit Massachusetts
to pursue goals that are not designed to favor its citizens or secure local
benefits." ' This assertion, even if true, does not settle the matter: the
question becomes how to define "favor its citizens" and "secure local bene-
fits." Tellingly, the court neither explains why, nor explicitly asserts that the
Massachusetts Burma Law does not do these things. Nor does the court ex-
plain how the law does not "enhance public values." The difficulty that the
court would encounter, if it addressed these questions, is how a law that, for
example, protects the environment as in Alexandria Scrap, enhances local
public values any better than a law which states that citizens' tax dollars
shall not be used to buy from companies doing business with dictatorial re-
gimes. There is a local moral milieu, as well as a local physical one, and
the court evidently does not want to become embroiled in that discussion.
E. Gould and the "Characteristically Governmental" Problem
The First Circuit goes on to find Massachusetts' action invalid under
Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations v. Gould
Inc.1 3 on the theory that Massachusetts' action is "characteristically gov-
ernmental." In Gould, the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin was not
acting as a market participant when it refused to purchase products from re-
peated violators of the National Labor Relations Act ('NLRA").114 The
First Circuit then cites a later Supreme Court decision that interprets Gould
to mean that "when the State acts as regulator, it performs a role that is
characteristically a governmental rather than a private role." ' 5 As with its
previous arguments, the First Circuit fails to complete its argument and
spell out why the Massachusetts Burma Law is characteristically govern-
mental. Commentators, as well, seem content to assert that the idea of a
boycott is "characteristically governmental:"
The stated goal of selective purchasing laws, as well as their principal effect-
boycotting companies with commercial ties to Burma in order to influence
events in Burma-demonstrate that these local governments are not simply
functioning as private purchasers of goods and services.
11 6
112 Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 64.
113 See Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282
(1986).
114 See id. at 283.
15See Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders &
Contractors of Mass./R.I., 507 U.S. 218, 229 (1993), cited in Natsios, 181 F.3d at 65.
116 Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States State and
Local Sanctions, 39 H~Av. IrT'L L.J. 443, 490 (1998). Mr. Price provided legal counsel to
the NFTC in its suit in the district court.
336
Massachusetts, Myanmar, and Market Participation
21:317 (2000)
The conclusion does not logically follow. It is typically "private pur-
chasers of goods and services" who boycott. And they tend to do so to in-
fluence events unconnected with their purchasing decisions, but more
importantly to refuse to be morally complicit in the questionable conduct in
which the company engages. Massachusetts is thus acting in its decision
precisely as might a private individual.
Gould is a clear case of a state simply deciding that it would impose an
additional legal penalty for previous violations of a federal law. The Wis-
consin law could not "even plausibly be defended as a legitimate response
to state procurement"' 17 because it forever barred companies from doing
business with the state for past violations of law. Though it came in the
form of a purchasing decision, the Gould law did not address any moral is-
sues concerned with purchasing because it conditioned purchases not on
what a company was doing but what it had done. Therefore, the Gould law
simply functioned to regulate behavior by increasing "penalties" for non-
compliance with the NLRA, and thereby to deter violations of federal law.
Wisconsin could not plausibly argue that it derived any benefit from refus-
ing to deal with contractors who in the past had violated the NLRA. In
contrast, the benefit derived by Massachusetts from refusing to purchase
from morally tainted suppliers derives not from the suppliers' identity, but
from their ongoing activities. A supplier may be removed from the Massa-
chusetts "restricted purchase list" when it ceases operations in Burma.
Thus, Massachusetts can validly claim it is avoiding "moral taint," and not
suppliers per se, whereas Wisconsin could not.
The First Circuit synthesizes South-Central Timber and Gould to assert
that "state regulations that go beyond the scope of normal market participa-
tion are not immune from commerce clause scrutiny."118 This statement
validly interprets those two cases, but all hangs on the definition of "nor-
mal." The court continues, without any link or explanation at all, that
"Massachusetts's desire to eliminate moral taint that it claims it suffers
from dealing with firms that do business in Burma does not permit it to act
to regulate activities beyond its borders."" 9 The unstated implication is that
the Massachusetts law is "beyond the scope of normal market participa-
tion." This conclusion is hardly inevitable, as it is conceivable that a con-
sumer might boycott a producer who engages in actions that the consumer
deems immoral. By coming to this conclusion, the First Circuit implies that
states must act more like for-profit companies that only look to the bottom
line, rather than individual human beings who may be motivated by moral
factors.
"1 Gould, 475 U.S., at 291, cited in Natsios, 181 F.3d, at 64-65.
"
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The First Circuit notes Massachusetts' contention that it acts as "pri-
vate actors" do because some companies have ceased doing business with
Burma due to human rights concerns.1 20 The court also notes, however, the
counterargument presented by NFTC that "[such] companies have not
ceased doing business with other companies that remain involved in
Burma."121 Both of these arguments miss the mark because Massachusetts
is not a "company," and should not be compared to a "company" for pur-
poses of determining whether it is a market participant or not. When it buys
goods and services, Massachusetts should be considered to be a consumer,
and if it acts as a consumer might do, and its actions are not regulatory in
nature because of some special economic power that it wields, it is acting as
a market participant.
Bizarrely, and without precedential support, the First Circuit claims
that "[t]he proper inquiry is whether Massachusetts is acting as an ordinary
market participant, not whether any participant has acted in such a fash-
ion."' 2 The problem with such a test is that it completely guts the market
participant exception. If "ordinary" means "economically efficient," as it
appears to in the context of the court's argument, then the First Circuit has
entirely misinterpreted the precedent. State governments are never "ordi-
nary" in this sense because they are not supposed to be entirely self-
interested. In Alexandria Scrap, the case in which the Supreme Court es-
tablished the market participant exception, the Court allowed Maryland to
impose different documentation requirements on out-of-state processors of
junk cars when they requested a bounty for their cars. Never mind the fact
that treating in-state versus out-of-state suppliers in the junk car market
never would qualify as an "ordinary" action for a company involved in that
market; the whole concept of a "bounty" generally is foreign to private
business. A bounty on scrap cars only makes sense from an environmental
standpoint, and only the state has the responsibility of protecting the envi-
ronment. In Reeves, the state's decision to limit its sales to South Dakota
residents was not economically efficient. In White, the state's interest in
employing Boston residents was not economically efficient. When a state
participates in any market, it is not "ordinary"--everything it does, it does
at least nominally in the public's interest, not its own. Thus, the First Cir-
cuit's restriction that only "ordinary" participation in a market may qualify
for the market participant exception utterly contradicts the purpose of the
exception: to allow the state to do what is best for the citizens of the state,
so long as it merely participates in the market. While it might be more eco-
nomically advantageous for the state of Massachusetts to continue to do
business with companies involved in Burma, the state believes that this
choice would not serve the people of Massachusetts, whom it represents.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 Id. (emphasis added).
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F. The Court's Confused Law and Economics
The First Circuit concludes its argument with a statement that demon-
strates its confusion on the issues crucial to the participant/regulator dis-
tinction: "Massachusetts has created a market, but it cannot regulate the
market it has created so as to regulate conduct elsewhere not related to that
market." 1 3 This statement and its flaws merit a full discussion.
The first problem with this statement is that Massachusetts has not
"created a market." Individual entities cannot create a market unless they
are monopolists or monopsonists. Massachusetts is, as the court notes, a
large consumer of goods and services. However, it does not consume a sin-
gle type of goods or services, and does not have special economic power
with respect to any of the goods and services that it purchases from global
companies large enough to be doing business in Burma. Additionally, as a
purchaser, Massachusetts does not differ substantially from any other pur-
chaser, either private or governmental. It does not demand that the specifi-
cations for the soft drinks or cameras or petroleum that it buys vary from
the market standard. It is therefore inaccurate, in economic terms, to sug-
gest that there is a differentiable market that Massachusetts has created
merely by having purchasing needs.
The second problem with the statement is that because Massachusetts
has not "created" a market, it cannot be "regulating" that market simply by
setting conditions for the type of purchaser from which it seeks to buy. If
Massachusetts had created a market, then it would have the economic
power to dictate terms to suppliers, as Alaska did in South-Central Timber.
It does not have this power and is incapable of truly dictating terms.
Merely because it does not have this kind of economic power, however,
does not mean that its actions cannot legitimately have some influence on
market behavior.124 Beyond the purpose of "enhancing public values" for
Massachusetts residents, one of the intents of the law was to influence mar-
ket behavior and to give an incentive to companies to cease trading with
Burma. And influence on market behavior is precisely what the market
participant exception excepts, even if there are interstate commerce effects.
Whenever a consumer boycotts a producer, she has dual goals in mind: (1)
to preserve her own morality by not enriching a producer that acts im-
morally, and (2) to give the producer an incentive to stop doing whatever is
objectionable. In the case of the individual consumer and the gigantic cor-
poration, the first goal is paramount. In the case of the governmental con-
sumer and the gigantic corporation, the second goal gains in prominence.
To suggest that Massachusetts acts as a regulator merely because it has
123 Id.
124 Indeed, if individual market participants had no economic power, consumer boycotts
would never work. Nor would consumer preferences have any effect. Markets function be-
cause there is feedback from consumers to producers.
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more influence than the typical corporate or individual consumer is to pe-
nalize Massachusetts for its size and nothing else. Such a stance leads to
the absurd conclusion that Massachusetts is too powerful to make its own
decisions about purchasing.
The third problem with the statement is the suggestion that Massachu-
setts is regulating conduct in Burma. This idea is ludicrous for a variety of
reasons. First, Massachusetts has no power to regulate private activity in
Burma. Neither does the federal government have the power to regulate
private activity in Burma. Second, the Massachusetts Burma Law does not
regulate private conduct relating to Burma in Massachusetts. The Massa-
chusetts Burma Law places no restrictions whatever on the ability of com-
panies doing business in Massachusetts to carry on trade in Burma. It is
only if companies wish to trade with the state and state agencies of Massa-
chusetts on an equal footing 125 with other companies that they must cease
their business in Burma. Massachusetts is not exercising any of the truly
coercive powers in its arsenal. 26
VI. CONCLUSION
A. The First Circuit and Supreme Court Decisions.
Ultimately, the First Circuit relies on a series of misconceptions of fact,
economic theory, and precedent in coming to its conclusion. When it com-
pares the situation in White to the case before it, the court fails to find a
meaningful way in which Boston's behavior, which was held constitutional,
differs from Massachusetts' behavior. The court suggests that it would
have been too much for Boston to require all of its contractors to hire only
Boston residents in all their projects, but this hypothetical fails to acknowl-
edge (a) the substantially different relative economic bargaining positions
of Boston versus local contractors in comparison to Massachusetts versus
global business, and (b) the sheer onerousness of the conditions implied by
the court's hypothetical, when compared to the requirement that companies
not do business in Burma. These two considerations render the court's con-
clusion that White does not support Massachusetts' position suspect.
When it addresses South-Central Timber, the First Circuit fails to rec-
ognize that Alaska was "regulating" primarily because it was in a position
of monopsony power with respect to the "market" in question. For this rea-
son, virtually any conditions that Alaska put on the sale of its timber would
have qualified as regulations. In addition, the court fails to recognize the
12s The Massachusetts Burma law does not absolutely bar trade between the state and
companies doing business in Burma, it merely raises by 10% the bids of such companies
when comparing bids with competitors. See infra section II.
126 One could easily imagine, for example, some sort of tax on companies conducting
transactions in Massachusetts and doing business in Burma.
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importance of the fact that Alaska sought to regulate the behavior of its
trading partners after the relevant transaction was finished.
The First Circuit uses Camps Newfound to show that the Supreme
Court does not want to see the market participant exception "expanded," but
the case's facts differ too radically from the ones presented by NFTC v.
Natsios for the case to be persuasive in the court's argument. Camps New-
found stands for the proposition that a state cannot use the market partici-
pant exception when it differentially taxes not-for-profit organizations
dependent on whether they primarily serve state residents.
The court acknowledges that Alexandria Scrap allows the market par-
ticipant exception to be used to further state interests beyond local benefi-
cial economic effects but asserts that the exception still must favor a state's
citizens. The court fails to show convincingly that the Massachusetts
Burma Law does not "enhance public values," as commentators have ar-
gued the exception is partially designed to do. In so doing, the court denies
the people of Massachusetts the ability to allow the expenditure of their
state tax dollars to reflect their values.
The court rolls out the Gould decision to attempt to show that states
that "punish" suppliers act in a regulatory manner. However, the court fails
to perceive that the law in Gould, unlike the Burma Law, amounts to just
another legal penalty for previous illegal conduct, and therefore does not
serve any interest even remotely related to the state's purchasing decisions,
and indeed interferes with the penalties carefully crafted by the federal law.
In other words, the court misunderstands Gould to mean that any statute
with a "moral" effect is impermissible, rather than correctly seeing Gould as
an admonition against inappropriate legal penalties. Ultimately, the Su-
preme Court adopted this broad interpretation of Gould in its Crosby deci-
sion, which allowed the Court to overlook entirely the issue of market
participation and to focus squarely upon preemption.
The First Circuit synthesizes Gould and South-Central Timber into a
doctrine in which the market participant exception applies only when the
state acts in an "ordinary" manner, which completely guts the exception be-
cause states often have interests that individuals and companies do not. In-
deed, the exception was designed specifically to allow states to do what
economic agents do not "ordinarily" do-discriminate on a basis other than
price and quality of product or service.
Finally, the First Circuit concludes that Massachusetts has "created a
market." Therefore any conditions which it places on its own purchases
qualify as "regulations" of that market. This view utterly fails to perceive
the realities of Massachusetts's economic bargaining position relative to the
huge businesses doing business in Burma.
B. The Future of Selective Purchasing Laws
The First Circuit's decision, upheld by the Supreme Court, tolls the
death knell for any kind of state purchasing conditions based on suppliers'
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activities abroad. This article analyzed the market participant exception be-
cause it seems the most legitimate justification for state-level action that
may influence, which is not to say "regulate," commerce in other countries.
If state governments may not use foreign involvement as a criterion for pur-
chasing decisions, it is difficult to imagine how states can reflect their citi-
zens' wishes when making those decisions. The federal judiciary's
shutdown of selective purchasing laws will no doubt come as a relief to
companies fearing retribution from a multitude of sub-national govern-
ments, and will likewise come as a relief to countries that will not have to
worry about economic consequences which flow from the acts of any
authority within the United States larger than the individual consumer and
smaller than the federal government. Perhaps the larger issue is whether
dealing with U.S. states should, for multinational corporations, be more like
dealing with individual human beings or more like dealing with profit-
maximizing corporations. Unfortunately for democracy, it seems that the
Federal courts have given the latter answer.
